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GOLAN V. GONZALES: AN OPPORTUNITY
TO REEXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
Krystal Joy Gallagher*
“There is an inherent tension between copyright laws and freedom of speech.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Golan v. Gonzales 2 presents an
opportunity for courts to reexamine the adoption by the United States of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (the “URAA”).3 The URAA is an international agreement restoring copyright protection to many foreign works not previously copyrighted in the United States as well as to many works already in
the public domain.4 As discussed below, pursuant to the Golan decision,
courts should begin analyzing copyright actions brought under the URAA for
First Amendment violations.
In Golan, the plaintiffs represented artists, educators, publishers, and
motion picture distributors.5 First, they challenged the Copyright Term Extension Act6 (“CTEA”) as violating the “limited Times” provision of the Constitu* J.D. Candidate, 2009, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas;
B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2006. Thank you Mom, Dad, Pearl, and Alec
for all of your support during law school. Special thanks to Professor Mary LaFrance for her
guidance on this Note.
1 Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the
Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002).
2 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). The research for this note closed
in March 2009. On April 3, 2009, the District Court of Colorado decided Golan v. Holder,
No. 01-cv-01854-LTB, 2009 WL 928327 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2009). The court held that
“[r]emoving works from the public domain violated Plaintiffs’ vested First Amendment
interests” and is consistent with this Note.
3 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)).
4 Id. § 514.
5 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1181.
6 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat 2827, 2827-29
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2006)). The CTEA extended the
copyright protection term from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life of the author
plus seventy years. Id. § 102. In addition, it extended protection of corporate works from
seventy-five years to one-hundred twenty years after creation or ninety-five years after publication (whichever is earlier). Id.
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tion;7 the Tenth Circuit reiterated the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Eldred v. Ashcroft 8 that the CTEA is constitutional.9 The plaintiffs next challenged section 514 of the URAA as shrinking the public domain in violation of
congressional power as changing the traditional contours of copyright protection set forth in Eldred.10 They also argued that the removal of works from the
public domain interfered with their First Amendment rights to free expression.11 The Tenth Circuit focused on the problems the URAA poses for copyright protection and First Amendment rights.12 The Golan court specifically
addressed the adequacy of two built-in First Amendment protection safeguards:
the fair use defense and the idea-expression dichotomy.13 The court further
held that the safeguards did not adequately address the plaintiffs’ claims against
the URAA.14 In particular, the court noted that the often-used fair use defense
is not a sufficient safeguard for plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests and went
as far as to say that “the fair use defense suggests that § 514 [of the URAA]
infringes upon plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.”15
The unanimous court in Golan agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that
the Eldred decision set forth a test requiring First Amendment review when
Congress changed the “traditional contours of copyright protection.”16 On this
point, Lawrence Lessig,17 attorney for the plaintiffs, stated:
The rule of Eldred, as interpreted by the 10th Circuit (and by us) is that Congress
gets a presumption of First Amendment constitutionality when it legislates consistent
with its tradition. But when it changes that tradition, its changes must be scrutinized
under the First Amendment. This is an interesting constitutional argument . . . . And
it also makes a great deal of sense: practices unchanged for 200 years are less likely
to raise First Amendment problems . . . but whether or not immunity is justified for
them, it is certainly not justified for practices that deviate from Congress’ tradition.18
7

Golan, 501 F.3d at 1181.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
9 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1185-88.
13 Id. at 1194-95.
14 Id. See also Jennifer Granick, Free Speech Sometimes Trumps Copyright, WIRED MAGAZINE, Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/commentary/circuitcourt/
2007/09/circuitcourt_0911. Granick explains the government’s position that First Amendment review only arises “if Congress either limited fair use or began to regulate ideas rather
than just modes of expressing those ideas.” Id.
15 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195. Unlike the plaintiffs in Eldred who were awaiting works to fall
into the public domain, the works at issue in Golan are already being used by the plaintiffs.
Id. at 1182.
16 Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, A Big Victory: Golan v. Gonzales, http://www.lessig.org/blog/2007/09/a_big_victory_golan_v_gonzales.html (Sept. 5,
2007, 4:05 EST) [hereinafter Lessig Posting].
17 Professor Lessig is a highly regarded constitutional law and cyberlaw scholar. See Stanford Law School, Directory: Lawrence Lessig, http://www. http://www.law.stanford.edu/
directory/profile/39/Lawrence%20Lessig/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). He is also the
founder of the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School. Id. He represented
the plaintiffs in Eldred and Golan. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003);
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1181.
18 Lessig Posting, supra note 16.
8
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Although he lost in Eldred, Lessig successfully used the language of the
Eldred decision to create a new test for reviewing First Amendment copyright
issues.19 The test provides that if the law alters the traditional contours of copyright protection, First Amendment review may be necessary.20 The Golan
decision provides courts with the opportunity to reevaluate the type of review
to apply in copyright claims arising under section 514 of the URAA according
to the test set forth in Eldred.
In Part II of this Note, I will look at the recent development of copyright
protection through the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 199821
and the URAA, as they are both challenged in Golan. I will then discuss
Eldred v. Ashcroft,22 a predecessor to Golan, in the evaluation of the CTEA in
Part III. An in-depth look at the Golan decision will follow, setting forth the
framework to analyze whether URAA claims should require First Amendment
review. I will then argue that the Golan court’s finding that section 514 of the
URAA may violate First Amendment rights; therefore, section 514 should be
scrutinized under First Amendment review.
II. DEVELOPMENT

OF

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

A. Evolution of Copyright Protection Terms
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”23 Congress has exercised its power under the Copyright
Clause’s “limited Times” provision to extend the term of protection for copyrights from the original term of fourteen years to the most recent extension in
the CTEA of 1998.24 The CTEA enlarged the terms of existing and future
copyrights to the life of the author plus seventy years for works created on or
after January 1, 1978.25
In 1790, Congress passed the first copyright statute, which provided a
“federal copyright term of 14 years from the date of publication, renewable for
an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term.”26 The Copyright
Act also allowed the renewal term to apply to existing works.27 In 1831, Congress expanded the federal copyright term for existing and future works to
forty-two years, with initial protection for twenty-eight years from the date of
19

Id.
Id.
21 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2006)).
22 Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
24 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194-96. As discussed below, the CTEA extends copyright protection
to seventy years after the author’s death and a term of ninety-five years from publication or
one hundred-twenty years from creation, whichever expired first. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a),
(c) (2006).
25 Id. § 302(c).
26 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194 (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124).
27 Id.
20
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publication and a fourteen-year renewal term, for existing and future works.28
The Copyright Act of 1909 extended the renewal term to twenty-eight years.29
In 1976, Congress changed the method of calculating the copyright term
and expanded the term from twenty-eight to forty-seven years.30 In particular,
“[f]or works created by identified natural persons, the 1976 Act provided that
federal copyright protection would run from the work’s creation . . . [and] protection would last until 50 years after the author’s death.”31 The 1976 Act
governed all works not published by the Act’s effective date and granted an
initial copyright term of twenty-eight years from the date of publication with a
renewal term of forty-seven years for published works with existing copyrights
as of the effective date, creating a full term of seventy-five years of copyright
protection if the works were timely renewed.32 The 1976 Act “aligned United
States copyright terms with the then-dominant international standard adopted
under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works.”33
B. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
In 1998, Congress once again changed the method of calculating the copyright term when it enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act (the “CTEA”).
1. Background
The CTEA extended the terms of existing and future copyrights by an
additional twenty years.34 In effect, this extension increased the term of
existing and future copyrights from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy
years.35 In addition, the CTEA provided a copyright term of ninety-five years
from the original copyright date if the copyright was in its renewal term at the
time the CTEA became effective, extending the protection of the Act
retroactively.36
2. Critique
The CTEA was the subject of much criticism. For example, the plaintiffs
in Golan denounced the CTEA, arguing that,
With the enactment of the CTEA in 1998, the average copyright term for all works
expanded immediately from an estimated 32.2 years to the maximum possible
term–either 95/120 years for corporate works or life of the author plus 70 years for
all other works. This new term is staggeringly long when compared to the “14 + 14”
28

Id.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1080 (replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541).
30 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573; Eldred, 537 U.S.
at 194.
31 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194-95 (citing to Copyright Act § 302(a)).
32 Id. at 195.
33 Id.
34 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, sec. 102, § 304, 112
Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998).
35 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 2007).
36 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2006) (amended by Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
§ 102).
29
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year term enacted by the First Congress, and also when considered against the 200year history of copyright protection in the United States.37

Critics argued that the CTEA extension was problematic because it negatively affects the public without furthering the goal of copyright protection to
enhance expression by providing incentives to authors and artists.38 The late
Professor Melville B. Nimmer explained: “In some degree [copyright]
encroaches upon freedom of speech . . . but this is justified by the greater public
good in the copyright encouragement of creative works.”39 Extending the term
of copyright protection wherein authors and artists no longer directly benefit
from the protection (i.e. the benefit inures to family members of the author or
artist) runs contrary to balancing the protection for authors or artists against the
benefit of dissemination of the work as it becomes part of the public domain.40
On this point, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that “[t]he idea is that
those who produce creative works deserve to be the ones to profit from
them.”41 The CTEA contradicts this principle by extending copyright protection for an additional seventy years past the life of the author. Although copyright acts have consistently extended the term of protection, the CTEA impedes
the advancement of the public domain by retroactively applying to works that
were expected to enter the public domain much sooner.42
Beneficiaries of the CTEA’s extension are most often studios and publishers who own the author or artist’s copyright.43 While creators have legitimate
interests in wanting to protect their work, the studio and publisher’s argument
for extending the protection of copyrights to their benefit becomes attenuated
and moves away from the purpose of copyright protection. Although the
CTEA’s extension may mean that purchasers will be willing to pay authors and
artists higher prices for their works because the monopoly on copyright ownership will last longer, the extended term does not advance the principles of copyright protection.44 Instead, it serves business interests to the detriment of the
public’s interests by keeping valuable copyrighted material from becoming part
of the public domain.
C. Uruguay Round Agreements Act
1. Background
The United States enacted the URAA in 1994 in order to comply with its
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).45 Golan
37

Appellants’ Opening Brief at 12, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (No.
05-1259) [hereinafter Appellants’ Opening Brief].
38 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 83.
39 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192 (1970), quoted in Chemerinsky, supra
note 1, at 84.
40 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 84.
41 Id. at 95.
42 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 3.
43 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 95.
44 Id. at 96.
45 David E. Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property After Eldred v.
Ashcroft: Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1255, 1285 (2007).

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ207.txt

458

unknown

Seq: 6

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

1-MAY-09

9:24

[Vol. 9:453

provides the following brief historical description of section 514 of the URAA
and Congress’s reasons for passing it into law:
[Section 514] implements Article 18 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic works. Ushered into being in 1886 at the behest of Association
Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, an organization founded by Victor Hugo and
dedicated to obtaining protection for literary and artistic works, the Berne Convention requires member countries to afford the same copyright protection to foreign
authors as they provide their own authors. In this case, congressional compliance
with the Berne Convention meant copyrighting some foreign works in the public
domain.46

Congress passed the URAA in order to comply with the WTO Agreement,
thereby granting retroactive protection to some works already in the public
domain in the United States if the works were by “foreign nationals or domiciliaries of World Trade Organization (WTO) or Berne countries . . . .”47
2. Critique
The problem with section 514 of the URAA lies with its restoration of
copyright protection to foreign works that were already in the public domain in
the United States.48 Before passage of the URAA, the three-step process of
copyright protection involved: (1) creation of a work, (2) copyright, and (3)
entrance into the public domain.49 Now, under section 514 of the URAA, the
ordinary copyright sequence has been altered because “a limited copyright
attaches at the moment a work is created” and “no longer . . . ends with the
public domain.”50 This alteration changes the original progression by allowing
works already available in the public domain to be taken out of the public
domain.
D. Eldred v. Ashcroft
1. CTEA and “limited Times”
The lead plaintiff in Eldred v. Ashcroft 51 was an Internet publisher who
depended on copyrighted works that entered the public domain prior to the
enactment of the CTEA as part of his business.52 The Eldred plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the CTEA as violative of the First Amendment
and the Constitution’s Copyright Clause under the “limited Times” restriction.53 The plaintiffs argued that the CTEA fails heightened judicial scrutiny as
a content-neutral regulation.54 The Court rejected this argument as discussed in
46

Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
Copyright Restoration of Works in Accordance With the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,765 (Dec. 19, 1997).
48 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 9.
49 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189.
50 Id.
51 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
52 Id. at 193. Eldred was joined by several other publishers, authors, and businesses who
also depended on copyrighted works entering the public domain. Id.
53 Id. at 193, 196.
54 Id. at 218.
47
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more detail below.55 The plaintiffs also argued that the CTEA’s twenty-year
extension created a perpetual copyright that violated the “limited Times”56 and
that the retroactivity of the CTEA failed to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”57
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this argument by focusing on copyright protection extensions in previous Congressional acts prior to the
CTEA.58 The Court explained that although it did not believe that twenty additional years for new and existing works was wise, Congress did not exceed its
authority in extending the protection.59 In addition, the Court held that the
CTEA’s retroactive application did not violate the Copyright Clause because
Congress consistently protected authors who received protection both before
and after the enactment of the law.60 The Court explained Congress’s judgment that protection should apply equally to an author selling his work a day
after the passing of the act as someone who sells his work the week before.61
The Supreme Court additionally held that the CTEA is a valid exercise of
Congressional power because the extension, lasting for a set term of years,
comports with the “limited Times” restriction.62 The Court stated:
[W]e find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to secondguess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however
debatable or arguably unwise they may be. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the
CTEA—which continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and
existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes—is an impermissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause.63

Furthermore, the Court noted the Berne Convention provided a valid rationale for Congress to pass the CTEA.64 Under the Berne Implementation Act of
1988, the United States must adhere to the Berne Convention by recognizing
the copyright of foreign works from other Berne Convention members.65 The
Court reasoned, “[b]y extending the baseline United States copyright term . . . ,
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.”66
2. CTEA and the First Amendment
Courts review “laws passed under the authority of the Copyright Clause
. . . only for rationality.”67 The Supreme Court rejected the Eldred plaintiffs’
55

See infra Part II.D.2.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199.
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211.
58 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200.
59 William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004).
60 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 208-09.
63 Id. at 208.
64 Id. at 205.
65 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
66 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-06.
67 J. Matthew Miller, Golan v. Gonzales: How Copyright Restoration Alters the Ordinary
Copyright Sequence and Invites First Amendment Review, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
353, 353-55 (2007).
56
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claims that the CTEA violates First Amendment principles because the First
Amendment and Copyright Clause were adopted close in time, indicating the
Framers’ view that free speech principles and copyright protection are compatible.68 Therefore, the Court found that the First Amendment and the Copyright
Clause do not conflict and “limited Times” is a valid exercise of Congressional
power that is not does not violate of the First Amendment.
The Court also discussed the built-in safeguards of copyright law that
accommodate First Amendment rights:
First, it distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible
for copyright protection[69] . . . . As we said in Harper & Row, this ‘idea/expression
dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.’ . . . . Second, the “fair use” defense allows the public to use not
only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances . . . . The fair use defense affords considerable “latitude for
scholarship and comment . . . .”70

The Supreme Court concluded by acknowledging that the District of
Columbia Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”71 The Court explained
that when “Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”72 As discussed
infra, the Tenth Circuit later examined this language in Golan.73
The Court also observed that the CTEA supplemented built-in First
Amendment safeguards of copyright law by providing provisions to protect
First Amendment rights.74 The CTEA “allows libraries, archives, and similar
institutions to ‘reproduce’ and ‘distribute, display, or perform . . .’ copies of
certain published works ‘during the last 20 years of any term of copyright . . .
for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research’ . . . .”75 In addition,
another provision of the CTEA, known as the Fairness in Music Licensing Act
of 1998, “exempts small businesses, restaurants, and like entities from having
to pay performance royalties on music played from licensed radio, television,
and similar facilities.”76
68

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 190.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) provides: “In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”
70 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985)).
71 Id. at 221.
72 Id.
73 See infra Part III.C.2 and accompanying text.
74 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220.
75 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2006)).
76 Id. It seems this is a stretch for the Court; simply providing additional protective provisions for small groups of people or businesses (i.e., allowing certain entities to use the
works) does not seem to warrant allowing an extension of twenty years.
69
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3. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Contrary to the majority’s opinion that the CTEA easily passed the “limited Times” restriction of the Copyright Clause, Justice Breyer argued that the
CTEA extension violated the “limited Times” restriction.77 Justice Breyer further noted that the twenty-year extension created a “virtually perpetual” copyright.78 Justice Breyer agreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments and stated that the
“primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but to their
heirs, estates, or corporate successors. And most importantly, its practical
effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of ‘Science . . . . .’”79
Justice Breyer further argued that as a nation dedicated to free speech,
“. . . . where line-drawing among constitutional interests is at issue, [he] would
look harder than . . . the majority at the statute’s rationality–though less hard
than precedent might justify.”80 Consequently, he noted that upholding the
validity of extending the duration of copyright protection would cause “serious
expression-related harm” by restricting traditional dissemination of copyrighted
works and inhibiting new forms of dissemination through new technology.81
Justice Breyer concluded that the “statute cannot be understood rationally
to advance a constitutionally legitimate interest” because the CTEA “falls
outside the scope of legislative power that the Copyright Clause, read in light of
the First Amendment, grants to Congress.”82 Accordingly, Justice Breyer
would have found the statute unconstitutional.83
III. PRINCIPAL CASE: GOLAN V. GONZALES
A. Facts
The plaintiffs in Golan v. Gonzales 84 challenged the CTEA and section
514 of the URAA.85 The plaintiffs represented various groups, ranging from
educators and performers to publishers and motion picture distributors.86 All
of the plaintiffs depended on copyrighted works already available in the public
domain.87 For example, plaintiff Lawrence Golan performed and taught foreign works as a Director of Orchestral Studies and as a Professor of Conducting
77 Id. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stated, “[t]he Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment seek related objectives—the creation and dissemination of information.”
Id.
78 Id. at 243.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 244-45 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-50
(1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973)).
81 Id. at 266.
82 Id. at 266-67.
83 Id. at 267.
84 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
85 Id. at 1181.
86 Id.
87 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 3.
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at the University of Denver.88 He relied on foreign works that became available in the public domain for performances and in teaching his students.89
The Golan plaintiffs made arguments similar to those of the plaintiffs’ in
Eldred.90 In particular, the Golan plaintiffs argued that the CTEA violated the
“limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause.91 The Tenth Circuit upheld
the district court’s dismissal of this claim as foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
Eldred decision.92 The plaintiffs next argued that “[section] 514 shrinks the
public domain and thereby violates the limitations on congressional power
inherent in the Copyright Clause . . . . [and] that [section] 514’s removal of
works from the public domain interferes with their First Amendment right to
free expression.”93 On this point, the plaintiffs argued that Eldred “requires
First Amendment review when Congress changes the ‘traditional contours of
copyright protection.’”94
B. Tenth Circuit’s Foundation
In Golan, the Tenth Circuit began its evaluation by examining the validity
of the URAA under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.95 The court
noted the Supreme Court’s explanation that the intent of the Copyright Clause
is “to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”96 The Tenth Circuit
further noted that providing limited monopolies to authors and artists encourages creative expression, thereby “promot[ing] broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.”97 Once the copyright protection term has
expired, the work goes into the public domain where people can use it at will.98
The copyright cycle then continues with new works inspired by the available
works that have fallen into the public domain, making copyright “‘the engine
of free expression.’”99
The court recognized Congress’ broad power to regulate copyrights but
noted limitations built into the Copyright Clause.100 Specifically, copyrightable works must be original, and the duration of protection is restricted to “lim88

Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 13-14.
90 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Lessig Posting, supra note 16.
95 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1183.
96 Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Id. (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34
(2003)).
99 Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
100 Id. at 1184. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
89
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ited Times.”101 The court also held that the “First Amendment can limit
Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause,” as recognized in Eldred. 102
The court began its review of the principal case by affirming the district
court’s dismissal of the CTEA claim as foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Eldred.103 The court also found section 514 of the URAA did not
exceed “the limitations inherent in the Copyright Clause.”104 The court instead
focused on the First Amendment issues that could arise under section 514 of
the URAA.
1. Plaintiffs’ Arguments Challenging the URAA
The Golan plaintiffs raised two main challenges to the URAA on appeal.
First, the plaintiffs asserted that the URAA exceeded the authority granted to
Congress in the Copyright Clause by removing works from the public
domain.105 Second, plaintiffs argued that section 514 of the URAA “disrupt[s]
the traditional contours of copyright protection and . . . demands First Amendment scrutiny.”106
In support of their first challenge, the Golan plaintiffs argued that “[t]he
effect of this unprecedented ‘copyright restoration’ is the wholesale removal of
vast numbers of existing works–including thousands of books, paintings, drawings, music, films, photographs, and other artistic works–from the public
domain.”107 Plaintiffs emphasized that they depend on works in the public
domain for their livelihoods and restoring copyrights to works that have passed
into the public domain burdens their creative expression.108 The plaintiffs
offered an example of the burden they faced because of the URAA:
Golan discovered that the cost for a single performance of Shostakovich’s Symphony
No. 1 by the Lamont Symphony Orchestra went from a one-time cost of approximately $130 to purchase sheet music for the entire symphony and unlimited performances to $495 to merely rent the same music for a single performance.109

In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the URAA significantly raised the
fees on works, costs that are often prohibitive to the plaintiffs.110 Plaintiffs
reasoned that this fee increase demonstrates that the “URAA’s substantial
harms to speech interests mirror the importance of the public domain in powering creativity.”111
The plaintiffs compared Congress’s authority to issue patents and the
importance of the public domain in the patent field to that of copyrights.112
Citing Graham v. John Deere Co. 113 for the proposition that “Congress may
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.
Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-22).
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1185-86; Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 3.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185-86.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 9.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 17.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 16.
Id. at 21.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ207.txt

464

unknown

Seq: 12

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

1-MAY-09

9:24

[Vol. 9:453

not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available,”114 the plaintiffs tried to persuade the court that Congress
should similarly not be authorized to remove copyrighted work from the public
domain.115 They argued that
[t]he rule of Graham applies equally to copyrights and patents by the express terms
of the Progress Clause, which concerns the grant of any “exclusive right” by Congress. . . . [T]he text of the Constitution prohibits Congress from restricting free
access to materials already available in the public domain, or subjecting works in the
public domain to exclusive rights.116

The court rejected this analogy and found that Congress had not exceeded
its power.117 However, the court used the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the
public domain in evaluating their second argument–that the URAA disrupts the
“traditional contours of copyright protection” and demands First Amendment
scrutiny.118 Plaintiffs argued that deviations from those “traditional contours
cannot automatically be presumed constitutional without an opportunity to
weigh their speech restrictive effects according to the principles of ordinary
First Amendment review.”119
C. Evaluation
The Golan court began its evaluation by looking at “‘copyright’s built-in
First Amendment accommodations’” that generally protect the public’s First
Amendment interest in copyrighted works.120 Next, the court evaluated the
plaintiffs’ challenges to the URAA.121 The court then applied the Eldred test
set forth in terms of “traditional contours of copyright protection . . . .”122
1. First Amendment Built-in Safeguards
The first built-in safeguard for copyright protection in the First Amendment is the idea/expression dichotomy.123 The CTEA denies copyright protection, “to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in [a copyrighted] work.”124 In other
words, “ideas are free but their particular expression can be copyrighted.”125
The Golan court stated that the utility of the idea/expression dichotomy
safeguard is “as a definitional mechanism . . . limited to determining whether a
proposed work is an idea or whether the work displays sufficient originality to
114

Id. at 6.
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 21.
116 Id.
117 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007).
118 Id. at 1187-88.
119 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 26-27.
120 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.
121 Id. at 1185.
122 Id. at 1187-88.
123 Id. at 1184.
124 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
125 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 89 (quoting United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173,
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
115
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constitute an expression.”126 The court announced that the idea/expression
dichotomy “is simply not designed to determine whether Congress’s grant of a
limited monopoly over an expression in the public domain runs afoul of the
First Amendment.”127 The court emphasized that the works at issue in this
case were undoubtedly expressions threatened by being removed from the public domain. Therefore, the idea/expression dichotomy safeguard did not help
determine the URAA’s constitutionality because the safeguard does not apply
under these circumstances.128 Although removing these expressions still left
people free to articulate their own ideas, the court stated that the true threat lies
“in the fact that the works are being removed from the public domain.”129
The second built-in safeguard in the First Amendment is the fair use
defense, which allows the public to utilize a copyrighted work for certain purposes.130 Section 107 of title 17 to the United States Code explains the fair use
of a copyright work:
[S]uch use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section [106], for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright.131

The fair use defense protects First Amendment interests in a copyrighted
work by “afford[ing] considerable latitude for scholarship and comment, and
even for parody.”132 The Golan court determined that the fair use defense did
not sufficiently safeguard the plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests because the
defense does not address works that have already fallen into the public domain
and are available for unlimited use.133 In addition, the court stressed that the
defense suggested that section 514 infringed upon the plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests because fair use allows for limited use, whereas section 514
removes access to works already available.134
Ordinarily, these two built-in safeguards insulate legislation from First
Amendment review; however,
[T]he Eldred Court indicated that such [First Amendment] review is warranted when
an act of Congress has “altered the traditional contours of copyright protection.” The
Court did not define the “traditional contours of copyright protection.” However, as
we discuss in detail below, one of these traditional contours is the principle that once
a work enters the public domain, no individual-not even the creator-may copyright
it.135

The Tenth Circuit ultimately found that the built-in safeguards did not
protect the plaintiffs, reasoning that section 514 “bestows copyrights upon
works in the public domain [and] these built-in safeguards are not adequate to
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Golan, 501 F.3d at 1194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003)).
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1184 (citation omitted).
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protect plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests.”136 The built-in safeguards are
inadequate because they do not account for works that have already entered the
public domain.137 Accordingly, on remand, the district court must conduct a
First Amendment analysis of section 514.138
2. Traditional Contours of Copyright Protection
The court then discussed the First Amendment analysis by applying the
traditional contours of the copyright protection test set forth in Eldred.139 The
court found that section 514 “alter[s] the traditional contours of copyright protection” because the “bedrock principle of copyright law [is] that works in the
public domain remain there . . . .”140 The court reiterated that the incentive of
copyright protection is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.”141 According to the court, the removal of works from the public
domain through section 514 did not further this goal and, in fact, hindered it.
Section 514 altered the copyright sequence by removing works from the public
domain when the normal sequence allowed copyrighted works to enter the public domain after the protection term expired.142 In addition, the court noted that
the history of American copyright law did not reveal a tradition of copyrighting
works already in the public domain.143
The court examined how the alteration of traditional contours affected
plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests.144 “[C]opyright law bears out the rather
obvious–but significant–point that works in the public domain belong to the
public.”145 The court explained that members of the public had a “non-exclusive right” to use material in the public domain.146 Accordingly, the court reasoned, “the First Amendment protects plaintiffs’ right to unrestrained artistic
use of these works.”147 The court found that by removing the works from the
public domain, section 514 “arguably hampers free expression and undermines
the values the public domain is designed to protect.”148 Therefore, section 514
is subject to First Amendment scrutiny because section 514 interfered with the
plaintiffs’ “vested First Amendment interests in the expressions.”149
Additionally, the court determined that unlike the CTEA, section 514 of
the URAA did not contain any supplemental First Amendment protections.150
Unlike the CTEA, “[r]ather than excepting parties, such as plaintiffs, who have
relied upon works in the public domain, the URAA provides only a safe harbor
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1195.
at
at
at
at
at

1196.
1188.
1187 (emphasis added).
1188.
1189.

at 1192.
at 1193.
at 1194.
at 1196.
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allowing a party to use a restored work for one year after receiving notice of the
restored copyright protection.”151 Further, in contrast to the supplemental safeguards in the CTEA (which allowed educational institutions rights to use and
distribute protected work and exemptions for smaller businesses),152 the URAA
did not offer a “guarantee of breathing space.”153 Therefore, the court held that
section 514 of the URAA must be subject to First Amendment review and
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.154
IV. PROTECTING

THE

PUBLIC’S FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS

As the law now stands, section 514 of the URAA is a valid Congressional
use of authority in governing copyright law, subject to First Amendment
review. The enactment of section 514 is important because it brought the
United States into compliance with the Berne Convention and ensured the same
protection for American copyrighted works in the one hundred other countries
that are parties to the Berne Convention.155 The exercise of Congressional
authority was proper because Congress has a valid interest in protecting the
copyrighted work of Americans in other countries. However, section 514 creates potential First Amendment violations that must be evaluated differently
than the CTEA because, unlike under the CTEA, works are taken directly out
of the public domain under section 514.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the passage of section 514, the Golan
court is correct in finding that section 514 has the potential to violate First
Amendment rights and should be subjected to First Amendment review. As
Professor Chemerinsky states, “[c]opyright protections are tolerated under the
First Amendment because they encourage speech. Extending copyright protections after the speech has occurred does not serve this purpose. Therefore,
such extensions should not be tolerated under the First Amendment.”156
Although Professor Chemerinsky made this statement in opposition to the
CTEA (before Eldred was decided), the argument is still persuasive and helps
illustrate why Golan was properly decided.
Section 514 of the URAA is distinguishable from the CTEA because it
changes the “traditional contours of copyright protection.”157 Rather than simply extending the term of protection, section 514 removes from the public
domain works that are currently used.158 Golan changed the “traditional contours of copyright protection” because, unlike the Eldred plaintiffs who were
awaiting works to enter into the public domain for their use, the Golan plaintiffs were already using works in the public domain that section 514 would
remove. In light of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, courts will need to determine
151

Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2) (2006)).
Id. at 1195-96.
153 Id. at 1196.
154 Id. at 1197.
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
A list of Berne Convention members is available at http://www.wipo.int/members/en.
156 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 85.
157 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
158 See supra Part III.C.2 and accompanying text.
152
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and apply the appropriate level of First Amendment review, and whether a
valid governmental interest justifies removing works from the public domain.
A. Section 514 Changes the Traditional Contours of Copyright Protection
Section 514 of the URAA alters the “traditional contours of copyright protection,”159 because it deviates from the principle that “works in the public
domain remain there”160 and creates a “depredation of the public domain” by
removing currently available works from the public.161 The Eldred court failed
to define the traditional contours of copyright protection, allowing the Tenth
Circuit to distinguish Eldred’s holding for the CTEA from section 514 of the
URAA.162
The government failed to persuasively convince the Golan court that the
traditional safeguards of copyright protection are limited to the idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use defense in terms of First Amendment challenges.163
The plaintiffs were correct in asserting that those two limits were “not the only
ways in which traditional copyright law harmonizes with constitutional free
speech protections.”164 Further, David Nimmer, a leading copyright scholar,
critiques the Eldred position that these two safeguards are the only factors used
in determining the traditional contours of copyright law, calling the Eldred
court’s position “inadequate, insofar as it implicitly limited the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright law” too narrowly.165
Due to this narrow interpretation of the “traditional contours of copyright
protection,”166 the Golan plaintiffs were able to successfully show that section
514 of the URAA does not fall within the narrow interpretation because taking
foreign works out of the public domain does not fit within the traditional copyright framework.167 Golan represents a positive step towards reigning in the
judiciary’s deference to Congress and promoting the notion that the judiciary
should protect the public domain and its important function to spark creative
work by making works more accessible.
B. Section 514 Raises Different Constitutional Issues than the CTEA
Even though the Supreme Court ultimately held the CTEA to be constitutional in Eldred, the differing facts of Golan are persuasive in illustrating why
section 514 of the URAA, unlike the CTEA, raises potential First Amendment
issues.168 Restoring copyrights of works already in the public domain has the
potential to stifle creative progress. As Professor David Shipley stated, “[t]he
159

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2007).
161 Granick, supra note 14.
162 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
163 See generally id. at 1190-97.
164 Granick, supra note 14.
165 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.06 (2008).
166 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
167 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192.
168 In Eldred, plaintiff’s products and services built on copyrighted works in the public
domain, Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186, whereas the plaintiffs in Golan were using works already
in the public domain, Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
160
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public domain is essential to . . . creative efforts . . . and the Supreme Court has
held that the public has a constitutional right to copy articles, designs, and other
works of authorship and inventions that have entered the public domain.”169
When a copyright term ends, the availability of that work in the public domain
is important to continued creativity in the arts. Another commentator, Jessica
Litman, notes that using works in the public domain is “the essence of authorship. And, in the absence of a vigorous public domain, much of it would be
illegal.”170
Unlike the Eldred plaintiffs, who did not have “unfettered access to any of
the works at issue,” the Golan plaintiffs brought suit to continue using works
that were already available in the public domain.171 The effect of the URAA
on the Golan plaintiffs was the loss of access to relied-on works. Under traditional copyright principles, once works are available in the public domain, the
plaintiffs would have unlimited access to the copyrighted works. As Justice
Stevens discussed in his Eldred dissent, retroactively extending copyright terms
would be “manifestly unfair” because the government would modify bargains
and grant extended protection at the expense of reliant parties.172
Justice Stevens’ logic extends to section 514 of the URAA and is persuasive because the URAA takes works out of the public domain that were already
accessible. Rather than removing expectations of future availability, as is the
case with the CTEA, the URAA strips away the rights of current users. As the
Tenth Circuit stated, “[i]t is clear that the Copyright Clause is meant to foster
values enshrined in the First Amendment.”173 Instead of fostering free speech
and the use of available foreign works, section 514 threatens to stifle the creativity of current users of these works.
In evaluating section 514 of the URAA, the Nimmer treatise posits that
section 514 extends much wider protection than the Berne Convention by protecting works that would not otherwise be eligible for protection in their home
countries.174 Professor Nimmer further notes that the “limited Times” of the
Copyright Clause strikes a balance between two interests—the authors’ interest
in “the fruits of their labor” and the public’s interest in gaining free access to
“materials essential to the development of society.”175 Section 514 throws off
this balance by giving more weight to the author’s proprietary interest at the
expense of the public’s interest.
Scholar William Patry and Judge Richard Posner, in their evaluation of
Eldred, assert that the retroactive nature of CTEA keeps many works from
falling into the public domain.176 The passage of the URAA “mandate[ed]
greater protection for foreign works than domestic works, and [revived] copyright protection for works that were already in the public domain under United
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Shipley, supra note 45, at 1261-62.
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990).
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188.
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.05 (2008).
Id.
Patry & Posner, supra note 59, at 1639.
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States law.”177 Section 514 of the URAA goes further than just retroactively
keeping works from falling into the public domain as the CTEA does; it takes
works out of the public domain that are already in use by unsuspecting artists
and restores copyright protection, regardless of reliance on use of those works.
Section 514’s only safe harbor allows the reliant “party to use a restored work
for one year after receiving notice of the restored copyright protection.”178
This safe harbor is insufficient to protect the First Amendment rights of the
user.
In Graham v. John Deere Co.,179 the Supreme Court held “Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available.”180 While patents and copyrights are different, courts often
analogize the two.181 The comparison between patents and copyrights shows
the Supreme Court’s belief that Congress should not take works out of the
public domain.
Professor Shipley notes that the majority in Eldred, in distinguishing the
patent and copyright monopolies, “seemed to forget . . . it ‘had consistently
viewed [the Copyright Clause] as authorizing Congress to strike an economic
bargain with authors on the public’s behalf.’”182 Rather than focusing on the
public’s benefit in the release of copyrighted material, as previous courts have,
the Eldred majority focused on the reward to the copyright owner.183 While
copyright owners have legitimate interests in protecting their work, the “limited
Times” language in the Copyright Clause shows the Framers’ intent to protect
the public’s interest in gaining access to copyrighted work for the benefit of the
public at large.184 Following the precedent set in earlier Supreme Court
cases,185 the Golan court properly recognized “the public’s constitutionally
supported right to copy and use works from the public domain”186 by holding
that section 514 of the URAA is subject to First Amendment review because it
takes works out of the public domain.187
Section 514 of the URAA poses a valid constitutional concern because
unlike the CTEA, it removes works from current users. As Professor Shipley
177

Shipley, supra note 45, at 1285-86.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (section 514 permits continued use if no notice is given). Section 514 also allows a person using a derivative work based on a restored work to continue
using it in exchange for reasonable compensation to the owner of the restored work; however, this does not affect the plaintiffs in Golan and does not warrant discussion in this
paper. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2), (d)(3) (2006).
179 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
180 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
181 See generally discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201-18 (2003) (majority
opinion); Id. 222-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182 Shipley, supra note 45, at 1265.
183 Id.
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964).
186 Shipley, supra note 45, at 1266.
187 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007).
178
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states, “the Copyright Clause should be read to prevent removing or burdening
free access to materials already in the public domain.”188 The plaintiffs in
Golan had a legitimate interest in their continued use of work available in the
public domain. Accordingly, First Amendment review is appropriate to section
514 challenges.
C. What Level of First Amendment Review is Appropriate?
In a traditional First Amendment review, the court must first determine
whether the regulation imposes a content-based or content-neutral burden on
speech.189 Based on this initial determination, the court will then apply the
proper level of scrutiny—content-neutral regulations receive intermediate scrutiny and content-based regulations receive strict scrutiny.190 According to this
framework, courts will first have to determine whether the URAA is contentbased or content-neutral.191 As Golan provides, “[i]f § 514 is a content-based
restriction, then the district court will need to consider whether the government’s interest in promulgating legislation is truly ‘compelling’ and whether
the government might achieve the same ends through alternative means that
have less of an effect on protected expression.”192 Importantly, “[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid.”193
Alternatively, if courts determine that the legislation is content-neutral, it
“‘must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’”194
As Professor Chemerinsky points out, “regulations that are unrelated to the
content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny,”195 which
will make it easier for section 514 to pass constitutional muster if it falls into
the content-neutral category.
Professor Chemerinsky explains the importance of the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral laws: “[T]he very core of the First Amendment is that the government cannot regulate speech based on its content.”196
The Supreme Court has said, “above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter or its content.”197 The government must treat all
speech in the same manner.198
188

Shipley, supra note 45, at 1294.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932-33 (3rd
ed. 2006).
190 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 460 (1998) (Under strict scrutiny, most speech
regulation will be held unconstitutional if it is not “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding
state interest.”).
191 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
192 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 813 (2000)).
193 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
194 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
195 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 90.
196 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189, at 932.
197 Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
198 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189, at 936.
189

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ207.txt

472

unknown

Seq: 20

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

1-MAY-09

9:24

[Vol. 9:453

In order to find section 514 of the URAA content-neutral, courts will have
to conclude that the government’s regulation is both viewpoint neutral and subject matter neutral.199 The regulation is viewpoint neutral when the government is not regulating speech “based on the ideology of the message.”200
Regulation is considered subject matter neutral when the government is not
regulating speech “based on the topic of the speech.”201 Professor Neil Netanel
makes the persuasive argument that “[c]opyright law stands outside [the] content-based rubric . . . . Its target is not the viewpoint, subject matter, or even
communicative impact of the infringer’s speech, but rather the infringement’s
deleterious impact on the copyright incentive.”202
Section 514 “applies to all speech regardless of the message,” and is therefore, content-neutral.203 Accordingly, and in light of Professor Netanel’s argument, courts likely will view section 514 of the URAA as content-neutral.
D. Is There a Valid Governmental Interest?
Assuming that the speech is content-neutral, the next step in the First
Amendment analysis is to determine what the important interest is, and whether
it withstands intermediate scrutiny.204 In a First Amendment challenge to section 514 of the URAA, the government would have to show a valid governmental interest in retroactively granting protection to foreign works already in the
public domain. With respect to copyright law, “encouraging the creation of
new works” is well regarded as an important purpose.205 Under intermediate
scrutiny, the court must determine “whether the statute will likely have the
effect of increasing the creation and distribution of speech.”206 By taking work
out of the public domain, section 514 of the URAA hinders both the creation
and the distribution of speech because the regulation removes works from the
public domain that are being utilized to create new works.
Professor Chemerinsky’s criticisms of the CTEA are instructive to an
analysis of section 514, as both raise similar issues. He contends the URAA
should fail intermediate scrutiny because “[r]etroactively extending the term for
copyrights does not offer an incentive for creating or distributing speech.”207
As the Golan court held, section 514 of the URAA causes work to be taken
from the public domain, hampering free expression.208 The important interest
to be protected under copyright law is “the engine of free expression,”209 and
although not explicitly stated by the court, removing work from the public that
is already using it obstructs the engine. On remand in Golan, section 514 of
199

Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 91.
Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 93 (quoting Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49 (2001)).
203 Id. at 92.
204 Id. at 94.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 95.
208 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2007).
209 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
200
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the URAA should fail intermediate scrutiny particularly because the Tenth Circuit plainly stated, “the fair use doctrine is not a sufficient safeguard . . . .”210
In addition to undertaking First Amendment review as set forth in Golan,
subsequent courts addressing the constitutionality of section 514 should reconsider the deference they have given Congress in authorizing copyright term
extensions. Courts have given Congress too much deference by upholding term
extensions when it has a detrimental effect on the public domain. In particular,
courts should be more critical of Congress’ willingness to remove works from
the public domain to grant foreign works more copyright protection. Although
adopting section 514 of the URAA brought the United States into compliance
with the Berne Convention and the WTO Agreement, taking works out of the
public domain conflicts with the goal of copyright law to encourage more creative work. Much as the Golan plaintiffs came to rely on certain works, other
members of the public may also face similarly prohibitive costs that keep them
from utilizing a work already in the public domain as inspiration for their own
work.
Golan’s holding that section 514 of the URAA must be subjected to First
Amendment review shows that there is legitimate concern that the section
threatens First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Congress should reevaluate
section 514 to find a way to comply with the Berne Convention while protecting the public’s right to use works already in the public domain.
For example, Article 18 of the Berne Convention provides:
(1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into
force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the
expiry of the term of protection.
(2) If, however, through the expiry of the term of protection which was previously
granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of the country where protection is
claimed, that work shall not be protected anew.211

This language seems to show that the Berne Convention does not require
the restoration of copyright protection to works already in the public domain if
those works have fallen into the public domain in its country of origin. Congress should look at why the legislation it passed to comply with the Berne
Convention goes beyond the Convention’s strictures. The legislation provides
copyright protection to works that do not comply with the formalities required
by the United States212 and extends protection in likely violation of our Constitutional rights under the First Amendment.213
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Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 18, Sept. 9
1886, as revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html#P205_40480.
212 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2006).
213 Although it might not be fair, I do not think that our First Amendment rights should be
extended to foreign authors because there are already enough First Amendment issues being
raised by Americans and policing the rights of foreign authors would likely be extremely
taxing on our system. However, this is an entirely different topic that probably deserves its
own article!
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V. CONCLUSION
At a minimum, all section 514 copyright claims should require First
Amendment review. While the CTEA has already been upheld by the Supreme
Court as a valid exercise of Congressional authority,214 section 514 of the
URAA creates First Amendment issues by taking works out of the public
domain. Rather than looking at whether Congress is authorized to extend the
term of protection for copyrighted works, courts will need to determine whether
section 514 violates the First Amendment, and if it does, what level of First
Amendment review courts should use. The likelihood that the URAA violates
the First Amendment requires more than just the judicial branch’s attention in
evaluating cases that arise under section 514. Congress must reevaluate section
514 to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention
through less restrictive means.
As attorney Lawrence Lessig successfully argued in Golan, in addition to
the “traditional contours of copyright protection” set forth in Eldred, courts
must look at the two widely accepted built-in safeguards–fair use and ideaexpression dichotomy–as triggering First Amendment review.215 A precedent
should be set that claims arising from section 514 warrant First Amendment
review because the Tenth Circuit decided that section 514 of the URAA alters
the traditional contours of copyright protection (by taking works out of the
public domain). The burden should fall on copyright owners asserting copyright interests in a restored work to overcome First Amendment concerns.216
In addition, Congress should reevaluate its adoption of section 514
because it allows works to be taken from the public domain that are not
required under Article 18 of the Berne Convention.217 Golan presents a situation with sympathetic plaintiffs (mainly teachers and artists) and shows why
taking works out of the public domain can be injurious to the Constitutional
rights of the public. Traditionally, courts have deferred to Congress when it
comes to copyright protection, but with First Amendment rights at issue, Golan
demonstrates that sometimes, courts need to intervene in order to get Congress
to take notice. By following the Tenth Circuit’s lead, other courts should challenge the notion that Congress should be given blanket deference in copyright
terms. In turn, Congress will pay more attention to the various section 514
claims and make appropriate amendments to protect the public’s First Amendment rights.
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Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Lessig Posting, supra note 16.
216 I think the burden is more fairly placed on a copyright owner than an unsuspecting user
who believed he/she was rightfully using material (that had fallen into the public domain).
217 The statute takes works out of the public domain that are not in compliance with the
copyright laws of the United States. See 17 U.S.C. §104A(h)(6)(C) (2006).
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